Title: MARKET DESIGN

Instructors: Sidartha GORDON and Vincent IEHLE

Objectives: this is a topics course in microeconomics. It covers recent developments on the allocation of resources on markets not necessarily governed by prices, with an emphasis on the allocation of human organs to patients and the allocation of public-school places to children.

Course Description:

1. House Allocation and Housing Markets: deterministic mechanisms

   • Roth and Postlewaite (1977) Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics.

2. Stochastic mechanisms


3. Kidney Exchange

   • Roth, Sönmez and Unver (2007) Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences, American Economic Review.
4. Introduction to two-sided matching


5. School choice and general many-to-one problems


6. Overview and discussion on French educational systems

- Admission to secondary schools
- Admission to college / universities
- Academic job market
- Teachers’ assignments

Texts Used: